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Introduction
Lease contracting was endorsed in late  1988 and again in early 1989,
but has not been widely adopted at  the farm level.  Concern about  the poor
response to lease contracting has led to new efforts to  facilitate  its
adoption, and also to  introduction of the individual proprietorship, a
more radical departure from the contractual relations of traditional
collectivized agriculture.  Three pieces of legislation introduced in the
last months of 1989  (the leasing law and draft laws on land and ownership)
address potential leaseholders' and proprietors'  reservations about the
legal status of new forms  of management.  In mid December,  1989,  farms
that contracted out all or a portion of their assets were offered the
opportunity to write off debt  in the  same proportion.
Support for lease  contracting at  the highest levels  of government and
the party is divided, but no one speaks publicly against it.  Rather,
conservatives  considered to be unenthusiastic  about leasing argue that
state and collective  farms  still have high potential as productive units,
and that small scale contracting should be purely voluntary, not
implemented under pressure.  As a purely voluntary program throughout  1989
leasing made little progress.  The legislation and debt write-off at  the
end of the year were  intended to make voluntary leasing more attractive.
With marketing, pricing, and supply of inputs untouched by reform,
however, leaseholders work under a sizeable handicap.  The apparent
inability to open marketing channels, reform prices, and deliver high
1quality agricultural implements  suitable  for small scale production
reduces incentives  for agricultural workers and farm managers  to take
advantage of opportunities created by the new laws,  both leasing and
proprietorship.  The hiatus  in initiatives on pricing and marketing in
agriculture  threatens a serious loss  of momentum in a sector vital for the
success  of the overall economic reform.
Incentives and Contractual Choice  in Soviet Agriculture
Changes  in remuneration and implicit contractual relations  linking land
and labor in Soviet agriculture have been central to  efforts to  increase
productivity since the early 1960s,  but they have had little  success.  The
traditional work point system of the collective farm had, in theory, many
characteristics of a team's payment regime.  It was supplanted in the  late
1960s and 1970s by straight wage contracts, and the team principle
applied only to the bonus.  In the  early 1980s promotion of the collective
contract was an attempt to revive  the team as a unit of remuneration, but
it was rejected by both managers  and workers.  In 1989 the lease contract,
similar to an individual or team share tenancy, was  introduced, but it,
too, has failed so far to  supplant the  straight wage contracts.  The
individual proprietorship makes the proprietor residual claimant of net
earnings, and is inconsistent with retention of straight wage contracts.
The effort to change organization at the farm level throughout 1989 was
thus a new stage in the attempt begun in the early 1980s  to  switch large
numbers of workers off straight wage contracts  to  alternative forms of
remuneration.
The effort raises  two  questions:  1) What is wrong with straight wage
2contracts  in Soviet agriculture?;  and 2) Why, once  in place, are  they so
difficult to  supplant?  A full answer draws  on two separate but linked
bodies of economic literature,  the  theory of incentives  and organizational
structure and that of contractual choice, and will not be attempted here.
Theoretical analysis  of incentives in collectivized agriculture has
usually employed two  assumptions  that limit  its practical applicability to
Soviet agriculture:  the  assumption that the  team principle applies,  and
that an individual's contribution can be monitored without cost.
Throughout the  1970s and 1980s  Soviet agricultural workers have been on
straight wage  contracts with a high degree of job security and high costs
of monitoring an individual's performance.  Justin Yifu Lin has developed
a model  of a team with costly monitoring, in which the incentive  to  shirk
is offset by.the team's collective willingness  to  invest in an optimal
degree of monitoring  (Lin, 1988).  In the  Soviet Union the dropping of the
team principle and contemporaneous softening of the manager's budget
constraint (through expansion of cheap credit and direct grants)  removed
the incentive  for any monitoring of individual performance  at all.
Shirking increased, not only for labor, but for all  inputs.
The  literature on contractual choice helps explain why workers and
managers  separately would reject particular alternatives to  the status
quo, a contractual  regime that offers relatively high returns with low
risk, funded by the  state budget and the banking system.  Considerations
of risk, return, interlinkage of factor markets, and imperfections  in
product markets define  the set of alternatives  that will be preferred to
the current contractual regime  (see, for example, Stiglitz,  1974,  and
Bardhan, 1989).
3Lease  Contracts:  (arendnye kontrakty  or Dodriady)
Under the contracts an individual  or small group agrees  to manage
assets belonging to a state or collective farm or  individual proprietor in
exchange for a rental payment.  Lease contract groups are small,  self-
selected, and members  are often related.  The lessees do not receive a
guaranteed wage, and instead earn residual profits according to  the
stipulations of the contract.2 In the past state or collective farms have
been the lessors, but if the draft land law is passed, an individual
proprietor could also lease out land.
There are two main forms of the lease contract as  it  is  now being
promoted.  The first is  called the targeted form.  It  is  the more common
and.  it binds producers quite closely to  the parent farm.  Targeted leases
can be simply repackaged traditional labor contracts  or genuinely new
contractual relations, depending on the terms.  A family, individual, or
small group contracts  to manage a portion of the farm's assets,  including
land, machinery, animals, and structures.  All  inputs and output are
marketed through the parent farm.  The contract specifies quantities  of
inputs that will be available and their prices, and sets a target
quantity of output that should be delivered to the farm in fulfillment of
the contract.  The mechanism for collecting the rent  is a difference
between the price the lessee receives for output and the price at which
the farm resells output to  the state procurement organizations.
If the contracted minimal sale  is  enforced, this becomes a combination
of fixed rent and share contract.  The fixed rent is  the difference
between the contractual price and procurement price times the  specified
4minimal delivery.  Earnings  on deliveries above  the contracted minimum
are shared, with the  share  determined by the ratio between the contractual
and procurement prices.  It  is not  likely that minimal deliveries can be
enforced, and the  targeted lease contract  is  best considered a share
contract with threat of revocation  in the  following period if deliveries
fall below the minimum.  Another  form of share contract is based on share
of profit, not share of crop.
Targeted leases are intended now to be the main form of leasing.  They
allow the  farm manager to  specify the product mix and regulate  the
behavior of the lessee by threatening to withhold delivery of needed
inputs.  As long as farm managers are themselves  still subject to  state
orders and sales  quotas,  they prefer targeted leases  that allow them to
retain control over the product mix and input distribution.
The second form of lease is  the free contract, which  is essentially a
fixed rent contract.  This is  considered suitable for land and assets for
which the manager of the parent farm has  little alternative use.  Small
livestock operations  in the nonblack soil zone far from the central farm,
or orchard, vegetable, and flower operations  that are too  labor intensive
for the parent farm to manage effectively are  offered on fixed rent
leases.  Lessees under free leases market their own output, although they
may market through  the parent farm if both sides  agree.  They also can
have their own accounts  in  the bank.
Data on adoption of lease contracting are  scarce and unreliable.  There
appears  to  be no mechanism in place  to monitor implementation or
distinguish new contractual  forms  from old.  Fragmentary data corroborate
the anecdotal evidence  that few people  are signing leases.  As of mid
51989 in the Russian republic, 43%  of collective and state farms  reported
that they had signed at least one contract, and only 9% of agricultural
workers were working under leases, some of which were undoubtedly not true
leaseholds  (Boev, 1989, p.8).
The observation that lease contracting is moving slowly has become
generally accepted, and several reasons are often cited:
1)  Farm managers  do not want to  give up control over  their assets;  2)
potential lessees  do not like  to be completely dependent on the  farm
manager for supply of inputs and marketing of output;  3)  Potential
lessees  take on greater risk in exchange for expected returns that may not
exceed the guaranteed wage;  4) Even if they earn more the  increasing
disequilibrium on consumer markets limits  the value of their earnings;  5)
The current pricing and marketing system discriminates against quasi-
independent operators;  and 6)  Leases do not provide security of tenure
even if they are written for as  long as 50 years.
This  is a formidable list and seems quite adequate to explain the
failure of the program so  far.  Yet there  is  another side  to this
failure.  Financial discipline has not yet hardened the budget constraint
that farm managers face.  They are not yet forced by economic measures
rather than political campaigns to make better use of their resources,
particularly labor and land.  Workers continue to draw secure and
relatively high wages even though farms cannot afford to pay them out of
their own productivity.  Wages for employees of collective farms went up
8% in 1989 compared to 1988  (Sel'skaia zhizn',  10/29/89).  This  is
slightly less than the average increase  in non-agricultural wages  (9%),
but it  exceeds increase  in productivity.  Many industrial enterprises
6funded excessive wage increases by using their new powers  to raise prices,
but most farms do  not have  those powers.  When the  farm cannot pay its
bills,  it applies  for a special price premium or takes  out another loan.
The cost of fixed wage contracts with annual escalators  shows up either in
the state budget or in the  accounts of the banking system.
The direct subsidy to pay the difference between costs to procure,
process, and transport food and low retail prices  in 1989 was 87.8
billion rubles, and is budgeted to  grow in  1990 to  95.7 billion (EG No.
40, October, 1989, p. 11).  The budgeted amount for 1990 represents a 30%
increase since 1987.  The large  and growing food subsidy is a major
contributor to macroeconomic imbalance and the budget deficit, earlier
reported as  120 billion rubles but recently revised to  92  billion (EG No.
40, October, 1989, p. 9).  Three quarters of the  agricultural subsidy pays
for meat and milk (Semenov, 1987, p. 35).
The subsidy does not include farm indebtedness unless bad debts are
written off the bank accounts  and transferred to  the budget.  When the
Food Program of 1982 went into effect  in 1983,  9.7 billion rubles  of bad
debts were written off, and 11.1 billion rubles rescheduled for repayment
to begin in 1991.  Farm debt increased by ten billion rubles  after the
price  increases of 1983, and additional debt was  rescheduled in  1987.  In
1987 collective and state farms held 34%  of the total bank indebtedness,
compared to 15%  in 1970  (Narodnoe khoziaistvo  sssr,  1987, p. 595.)  In
1988  72  billion rubles constituting approximately half of total farm debt
was rescheduled.
Gorbachev indicated  in his speech to  the March Plenum in 1989 that farm
debt would not be written off because  the budget could not absorb  it.  In
7December, 1989, however, a massive  (73.5 billion rubles) new debt write-
off was announced.  Farms that received fall-out from Ghernobyl and those
being reorganized as agrarian subsidiaries of industrial enterprises will
be automatically released from all debt.  Other  farms that offer a portion
of their assets on lease can write off the same proportion of debt.3 Much
of the money loaned to farms has been used to cover payrolls, and its
inflationary impact has already been absorbed.  A wholesale write-off of
farm debt without genuine restructuring of asset management at  the  farm
level, however, would fuel a new cycle of inflationary  indebtedness.  It
is  not yet clear that targeted leasing, even if widely adopted, will
provide the needed financial discipline and restructuring.
The  financial problems of the agricultural  sector at the farm level
and the macro level are directly related to  the failure of repeated
attempts  to reform the wage system.  It  is unlikely that farms will
participate in the internal reorganizations necessary to bring down costs
of production and increase productivity as  long as  they can pass high
costs on to  the budget or the banking system.  According to the latest
published timetable for the  reform, "toward the end of 1991 bankrupt
collective and state farms will be reorganized as  individual farms,
cooperatives, etc."  (EG, No. 43,  1989,  p. 7).  The new debt write-off
calls  this timetable into  question, since bankrupt farms will be harder to
recognize once shorn of their debt.
Terms  of Contracts
The contractual process under current conditions  inhibits  the spread of
lease contracting.  Managers  are under little pressure  to sign contracts,
8and face no competition from neighboring farms  in retaining their best
workers.  Productive workers have most to gain from leasing.  The farm
manager may, however, drive a much harder bargain with them than with
shirkers whom he would like  to get off the payroll, but who are reluctant
to leave.
Productive workers cannot in practice negotiate with the manager of a
neighboring farm unless they are willing to forfeit their homes and
investment in household plots.  Owner occupied housing and household plots
are important assets  for many rural families, and their disposition under
leasing or individual proprietorship has not been clearly addressed.  In
the past a family retained the right to occupy an owned home and farm a
household plot only if a family member was a current  or retired employee
of the farm.  If the  family severed relations with the farm, the
household plot was usually reassigned and the house sold or abandoned.
Leaseholders or individual proprietors might want to quit their employment
with the farm but retain housing and the household plot.  If they do not
have the right to do  so, some will opt for targeted intra-farm leaseholds
simply to keep their housing.
As  long as  the lessee and lessor are expected to negotiate contracts in
the absence of competitive markets, the process will be one of bilateral
monopoly, with most of the power on the side of the farm manager.  There
are no systematic reported data yet on terms  of leases, but reports  from
the agricultural press suggest that farms are exacting high rental  fees
from leaseholders.  In an example reported from Tselinograd oblast',  a
leaseholding brigade sold wheat to the parent farm for 7 rubles per
centner, and the farm resold it to  the procurement agency for 13
9(Sel'skaia zhizn',  29 January,  1988).  It is unclear from the account who
paid for seed, fuel,  fertilizer, and other purchased inputs, but these are
usually paid in full by the  lessee.  The leaseholder's share  (54%)  in this
case seems quite low if  it includes both labor and purchased inputs, but
high if it is  only labor.  Another set of contractual prices reported
from Orlovskaia oblast' is  also quite  low:
Table 1
Contract Prices and State Procurement Prices
(Vyshne-Ol'shanskii State Farm, Orlov Oblast',  1988)
Contract Price  Procurement Price
grain  5,89 rub/cent  10.50  (wheat)1
sugar beets  2.75 rub/cent  5.402
potatoes  8.28 rub/cent  10  - 163
milk in winter  28.00 rub/cent  36.204
milk in summer  18.00 rub/cent
1.  This  is  the average price  for the RSFSR.  The zonal price  for
Orlovskaia oblast' may be  lower, but not less  than 9 rubles  70 kopecks.
The price  for this individual farm may differ from the zonal price.  Rye
is  also grown in Orlov province.  The  state procurement price  for rye on
average in the RSFSR is  15 rubles per centner.
2.  Average for the RSFSR
3.  Depending on quality and time of delivery
4.  Average, RSFSR, all seasons
Sources:  Selskaia zhizn',  August  2, 1988,  and A. M. Chursin, Tseny i
kachestvo sel'skokhoziaistvennoi produktsii  (Moscow: Kolos,  1984).
These contract prices  are very low, and suggest a share of at  least
40%  for the parent farm, although the  full parameters of the contract are
not reported.  The share is  probably even higher, since bonus payments
10raise farm prices above base procurement prices.
Concern about the  level of rental payments has had two consequences.
The  leasing law and the draft law on land both assign the rural  Council of
People's Deputies  the power to secure a land allotment  (either leasehold
or proprietorship)  for any applicant qualified to work it.  Workers
dissatisfied with terms  offered by their farm manager can apply to  the
Council of People's Deputies, but the extent  to which the  Council will be
able to  offset the manager's monopoly power has not yet been tested.
There  is  a growing demand for standard procedures  for valuing
contracted assets, particularly land.  One set of guidelines issued in
spring of 1988 by the All Union Scientific Research Institute  for
Agricultural Economics  in Moscow calls for fixed rent payment for land or
animals equal to planned or accounting profit  (Dribvl')  for the asset in
the use specified by contract  (Rekomendatsii, 1988).  This procedure
requires a higher level of performance for the leaseholder than for the
parent farm, since actual profit often falls  short of planned profit.  It
also makes rental rates very sensitive  to distortions in the price system
and provides no linkage  to land quality.
A subsequent set of guidelines issued in late 1989 by the same
institute is seriously flawed (Boev, 1989,  p. 60).  Negotiants  are
directed to take the net present value of the actual  (not planned) average
profit stream at an 8% discount rate  to  find a monetary value of a hectare
of land.  The monetary value  is  then augmented by the  foregone earnings  of
the cash value of land over the duration of the  lease (25  years)  at the
current rate of bank interest  (.5%  annually).  The resulting sum is  to be
divided by the  duration of the  lease to find an annual rental  rate.
11This odd procedure leads  to the recommendation that short term lessees
pay more annually for  the land than long term leaseholders.4 The double
counting of net present value, first over an infinite horizon at 8% and
then over a 25 year horizon at  .5%,  does relatively little harm because
the bank rate is  so low. If  it were more realistically related to  the
current inflation rate, the rental  rate of land according to  this
methodology would far exceed what an agricultural producer might expect to
earn from it under reasonable management.
The procedure  is  further flawed because  it is based on profit, which
includes  returns  to factors other than land, as well as distortions  in the
price system.  Workers on poorly managed farms would pay less  for land of
comparable quality than would those on better managed farms.  This  is
perhaps consistent with the effort to switch the  financially weak farms
over  to full scale leasing, but a  methodology based on marginal returns to
land of comparable quality would be economically more justified.  In most
parts  of the Soviet Union land quality has not been measured adequately to
serve as a basis  for setting user fees.  The draft land law calls  for a
full land cadastre throughout  the country to be carried out by the Council
of Ministers of the USSR.
The leasing movement, sanctioned with enthusiasm in 1988  and endorsed
again with fanfare at the March plenum on agriculture  in 1989,  appears now
to have lost momentum.  Expectations  for voluntary leasing may have been
too high initially, anyway.  The Hungarian experience suggests  that even
when offered the opportunity to take  out leases, many people on
reasonably managed collective  farms choose  to retain the security of their
farm employment, and enlarge their private plots or subsidiary holdings
12(Szelenyi, 1988).
This hybrid blend of collective and private organization may not be
viable in the long run, since costs  of production on Hungarian collective
farms remain high, and the ability of the state budget  to absorb them is
conditioned on the health of the macroeconomy.  Yet it has apparent appeal
to agricultural workers  in an economic environment  inhospitable to
independent operators.  The possibility of combining wage work and a
leasehold or individual proprietorship has received little attention in
Soviet discussions, but families may achieve  it by allocating effort
internally and regulating the size of the  leasehold.
Few would argue that leasing should be mandatory or forced.  Yet if
it  is  to remain voluntary and have a chance of success,  the parameters
within which voluntary decisions are made must be changed.  An important
change would be imposition of fees for  all users of agricultural land, not
just leaseholders.  Throughout 1989 leaseholders were expected to pay a
rental fee  to  the parent farm for land that the  farm received free of
charge.  The farm manager could collect returns  to land either indirectly
as producer rents or directly as rental payments from a leasehold.
Underutilized land had an opportunity cost (foregone earnings  from
potential rental payments in excess of producer rents), but no direct
cost.  Furthermore,  the opportunity costs may have been low if  there was
little known demand for leaseholds.  If  the farm manager and the  lessee
faced the same user fees,for land, managers concerned about cash flow
would actively seek lessees  for underutilized land.
According to  the draft land law, all users will pay for land, but the
timetable for implementation of universal user fees  is  unclear.  Fees will
13probably follow completion of the land cadastre, and in  the meantime
lessees and individual proprietors will be pay fees that  state and
collective farms do not.
The Legal Foundation for Leasing and Proprietorship
Three pieces of new legislation bear directly on leasing and more
generally on property relations  in agriculture.  The Basic Law of The USSR
and Union Republics on Leasing was  issued in draft form in September,
formally passed on November 23,  1989,  and took effect January 1, 1990  (EG,
No. 49, December, 1989,  pp.  14-15).  The draft version of the law on
ownership was issued November 14,  1989  (EG No. 48, November, 1989, pp.  9-
10).  The draft version of the new land law was published on December 6
(Izvestiia,  December 6, 1989).  These pieces of legislation strengthen the
legal  foundation for property relations  that deviate from those of
traditional  collectivized agriculture.  They contain ambiguities and
contradictions, however.
Many of the ambiguities relate  to the status of land ownership.  The
ideological  constraints on property relations involving land appear to be
greater than those relating to other factors of production.  For example,
the draft property law allows  individual ownership of means of production
except land.  The  law on leasing sanctions leaseholders'  (but not
proprietors')  use of hired agricultural labor.  Each of these  is  a
significant departure from past ideological prohibitions.  Yet land
remains  in a special category.  Each piece  of legislation distinguishes
between proprietorship of land (vladenie) and ownership  (sobstvennost').
A proprietor cannot buy, sell, or mortgage the asset, while an owner has
14full rights  of disposition, including sale and mortgage.
Individual proprietorship of agricultural land is  sanctioned in each of
the three pieces of legislation, and full private ownership with rights  to
purchase and sale is prohibited.  (As a proposed exception full private
ownership of limited quantities of land for homes and dachas would be
allowed  (Draft Land Law, addendum, article 5).  This land could be bought
and sold, but agricultural land could not.)  Individual agricultural
producers, small groups, or families would be granted lifetime inheritable
proprietorships or  long term leaseholds with user fees  determined by the
rural Council of People's Deputies.  State and collective farms that stay
in business would have rights of use but not proprietorship of their land
and would pay user fees.
The  legal assignment of land ownership promises  to fuel rather than
quiet controversy over the  issue.  There  are four general categories of
ownership of all property: by citizens,  collectives,  the state,  and
foreign entities.  According to  the draft law on ownership, land can be
owned, and is  included under state  ownership.  It  is  said, however, to
belong not to  the state, but to  "the people  (narod) living on a given
territory, to  Soviet people as  a whole"  (Part IV, article 23).  The draft
land law states  that land  is  the property of  "the people living on a given
territory" with no mention either of the state or the Soviet people  as a
whole.  Whether  land is  owned by the  Soviet people, the people of the
republics, or a lower territorial designation is  unclear.  An alternative
version of the draft law on property proposed by the  Supreme Soviet of
Lithuania calls for land ownership by the  republics  (EG, No. 48, November,
1989).
15In comments on the  draft land law, A. M. Emel'ianov, a member of the
committee that drafted it,  states that the committee rejected ownership of
land by the national or republican governments in favor of ownership by
the "people."  Another commentator,  People's Deputy and head of the
subcommittee on new economic legislation, A. A. Sobchak, states  that
according to  the  draft land law, land remains in state ownership, and
land users pay rent to  the owner  (Sel'skaia zhizn',  October 26,  1989).
Sobchak expressed the expectation that large numbers of proprietors or
leaseholders could be on their land already in spring of 1990.
The  law on leasing covers  leasing in all sectors of the economy.  The
owner of resources has  the right to  lease them.  State enterprises can
lease physical assets that they control, but do not own.  Land is  in a
special category, and can be leased in two ways.  A potential leaseholder
can seek an "intra-farm leasehold" by negotiating directly with the
manager of the state or collective farm that holds the  land and employs
him or her.  Alternatively, he or she can apply to the Council of People's
Deputies,  in which case the  Council can seize an allotment of state or
collective farm land and reassign it  to the lessee.  The Council then
becomes  the lessor of the  land.  Subleasing is permitted with
restrictions  (Part I, article 7).
The  law states that the  "corresponding [sootvetstvuiushchie]"  Council
of People's Deputies will have jurisdiction over division of land, but
does not specify which council, whether village, district, or higher
level.  The land law is  also vague  in its reference to  "corresponding"
councils.  In his commentary on the draft land law, A. M. Emel'ianov
states  that village councils are  to  apportion land (Sel'skaia zhizn',
16October 28,  1989).  The village councils were chosen in an effort to
dilute  the  state and collective farm manager's monopoly power in
questions of land disposition.  Emel'ianov's commentary appears  to be
stronger than the language  of the  law, however.  The draft  law on
ownership states that district and city, not rural, Councils of People's
Deputies will distribute  land for agricultural use,  including leaseholds
(Part IV, article 3).
The  three pieces of legislation thus have conflicting language on who
will distribute the land.  They furthermore say little about how land will
be distributed, other than to note that laws  at  the level of the republic
and autonomous region will govern procedures for confiscation of state and
collective  farm land for reassignment to  individual proprietors and
leaseholders.  The rural Council of People's Deputies appears  to have
power, at least in the area of proprietorships, but there may be confusion
regarding overlapping jurisdictions and appeal to higher territorial
Councils.  The ambiguity is  greatest with regard to leasing, when the
parent farm will retain use rights.  It  is unlikely that a lease could be
imposed upon an unwilling state or collective farm if  the lessee would be
dependent on that same farm for purchased inputs, services,  and marketing.
Despite their ambiguity, the  laws alter the purely voluntaristic nature
of leasing and proprietorship.  Farm managers will no longer be able
unilaterally to thwart the  desire of workers to have access to  land under
new contractual relations.  Implementation of the  laws and testing of new
property relations promises to be contentious.
The leasing law clearly states  that the  output of leased property
belongs to  the lessee  (Part I article 9).  Leaseholders have expressed
17concerns  that without ownership of their assets  they could not defend
ownership of the product, and the courts have on at least one reported
instance confirmed their fears.  A state farm repossessed fattened cattle
from a leaseholder without contracted compensation, and the court found in
the farm's favor  (Sel'skaia zhizn',  October 14,  1989).  The two  issues in
the case concerned the  leaseholder's  right to ownership of a non-land
asset  (the cattle) and to  the product of leased assets  (weight gain).  The
law on leasing states  that the leaseholder owns  the product outright, and
can purchase leased assets  (except land) through negotiation with  the farm
manager.
The draft land law, however, states that the proprietor
(zemlevladel'ets) of land has ownership  (sobstvennost')  of crops and
structures  on his or her land.  The proprietor may lease out land, but
according to  a strict reading of the draft land law, it appears  that the
proprietor retains ownership of crops even on leased land.  The law on
ownership  states that the  leaseholder has full ownership of the produce of
leased assets, and that all leased assets except land may be individually
purchased by the leaseholder.
The three pieces of legislation together provide a legal framework for
expansion of small holding, both through leasing and independent
proprietorship.  The mechanism for redistributing land is not clear and
the methodology for valuation has not yet been chosen.  Prohibitions  on
the purchase and sale of land will be  costly  if retained in the  long run,
but may be useful now.  Disequilibrium in the asset market would rapidly
drive  land prices up  if land could be bought and sold now, and would
defeat the  effort to allow a class of "proprietor-operators" to  emerge.
18In July, 1989, Lithuania passed a law legalizing private
proprietorship of up to  50 hectares  of land if  it is  used as a family farm
(Pravda Litwv,  July 9, 1989).  The land cannot be sold or mortgaged and
cannot be  rented, although the term for rent  (vnaem) is different from the
term used for lease  (arenda).  Farmers who want to  start a family farm
with land owned by their family prior to collectivization  (or other land)
apply to the executive committee of the local  council of people's
deputies.  A local commission set up by the Council of Ministers of
Lithuania takes the application, surveys and values  the land, and oversees
the transfer.
Lease Contracts and the Collective Contract
The precursor to  the lease contract was  the collective contract.  As
late as fall of 1987  the collective contract brigade was hailed in the
Soviet agricultural press as  the most progressive form of organization of
agricultural  labor.  Yet by mid in 1988 the collective contract had been
eclipsed by its successor,  the lease  [arendnyi]  contract, and exposed as a
transitional,  ineffective, and unpopular form.
Collective contracts began to appear  in significant numbers in the
early 1980s,  and the campaign was  increasingly associated with Gorbachev
personally.5 In his address  to the  Party Plenum in July, 1988,  Gorbachev
noted that since 1983 he had made  a  major effort to promote the
collective contract in various  forms.  Under the collective contract, a
group of workers negotiated with the  farm management to perform a set of
tasks in exchange for a specified payment.  The group monitored the
performance of its members and divided earnings accordingly.
19The  contracts included elaborate restatements  of labor norms and bonus
payments  for specific  tasks.  Brigades were encouraged to  implement
monitoring and accounting schemes using the  "coefficient of labor
participation  [KTU]"  to apportion the new bonus among themselves.  This
was  essentially the work point system of the pre-Brezhnev era, and workers
who violated discipline could be docked points  in the  final division of
earnings.  The collective contract as  originally conceived was consistent
with the effort to  instill tighter labor discipline.  Since the pay of
each brigade member depended at least  in part on the performance of the
team, tolerance for widespread shirking and lax discipline was expected to
diminish.
Alchian and Demsetz argue in their classic article on the nature of the
firm that monitoring labor performance is  costly, and that a monitor has
incentive  to do the job only  if he or she  is  residual claimant to  earnings
net of payments  to other  inputs  (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972.)  The
collective contract system shifted the monitoring function to brigade
members and made them residual claimants  of income.  It also  imposed upon
them a form of organization that had high costs of monitoring and
accounting.  Use of the new work point system was cumbersome  and tied
brigade members  to the  old norms  for job performance.  Many of the
original brigades were large;  the average  in reported data  is  25,  but many
were  larger still.  Membership was diverse and not self-selected.  The
work point system with a heterogeneous work force was cumbersome and
costly to  administer.  Few brigades bothered to use the work point system,
and distributed bonuses in proportion to base pay, as  they had under the
old system.  By 1987 the use of the work point system was rarely praised
20or even mentioned.
The collective contract brought higher, not lower costs of production.
The director of a state farm in Orlovskaia oblast' reported that the
farm's yields increased significantly with adoption of the collective
contract, but so did costs of production:  "Contract collectives tried to
increase output at any price, and did not  take costs  into account"
(Sel'skaia zhizn',  August  2, 1988).  Costs rose  in part because workers
negotiated wage increases as  a price for monitoring themselves.  The base
tariff wage became the advance payment for workers on collective  contract
brigades, and.payment according to output functioned much as  the bonus
under the old system.  Higher wages coupled with poor control  over
purchased inputs pushed costs of production up.  The collective contract
thus not only failed to ameliorate the existing financial crisis  in
agriculture, but worsened it.
The collective contract brigade was an unstable organization.  Between
1985  and 1987  there were many reports of brigades dissolving and
reconstituting themselves  in what amounted to a search for  lower
monitoring costs.  Brigades reported as  successful  in the press were
increasingly small brigades, although the official aggregate data do not
show much diminution.  This  is probably because the aggregate data include
the wholesale rechristening of large traditional brigades as collective
contract brigades, and the simultaneous breakup of older collective
contract brigades  into  smaller self-selected and family units.
The weak agricultural program prior to  1988 put additional and
unrealistic expectations  on gains to be realized from the  collective
contract.  When asked at  the  1987 Joint Soviet Economy Roundtable  "Why
21not take agriculture first,  instead of starting with industry--the hardest
sector of all?,"  Abel Aganbegyan responded, "We did start first with
agriculture by establishing Gosagroprom and encouraging introduction of
the collective contract"  (Aganbegyan, 1987).
Despite glasnost',  mounting evidence that the collective contract was
not working surfaced only when the deteriorating financial crisis  in
agriculture in late 1987  forced a reevaluation of agricultural policy
(Brooks,  1988).  Profiles of successful arendatory replaced those of the
collective contract brigades, and many brigades reconstituted themselves
under new lease contracts.
The proportion of the work force working under collective  contracts
continued to  increase  as  individuals and farms still on the wage system
switched over to  collective contracts.  Even while the numbers went up,
however, disenchantment with the collective contract and its results was
openly expressed.  At the March Plenum  (1989),  Gorbachev reaffirmed his
commitment to  the collective contract, but observed, "Experience has shown
that there are more radical forms of management now based on long term
leasing of land and other means  of production with full financial
independence"  (Sel'skaia zhizn',  July 30, 1988,  p. 2).  He went on to
advocate lease contracts of 25 or even 50 year duration.
Gorbachev and other leaders stress the financial autonomy and
responsibility of the tenant, and by implication underscore the failure of
the collective contract  to bring the desired cost savings.  N. I. Ryzhkov
commented on the Law on Cooperatives  in May of 1988,  "After all,  the state
is  not responsible for the activities of any form of cooperative"
(Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,  No. 21, May 1988, p. 10).  The same is  true for a
22leaseholder working under contract.
Lin's model of a team with costly monitoring of individual effort can
be used to  explain the  failure of the collective contract (Lin, 1988).
The team principle was used only for a portion of earnings  amounting
usually to about 20%;  collective contract remuneration was  linked closely
to the wage tariff.  It did not pay for workers to  assume monitoring costs
for such a small portion of pay, and the  continued soft budget constraint
provided little incentive to  impose monitoring.
Straight Wage Contracts Prove Resilient if Inefficient
Khrushchev monetized agricultural earnings by raising wages on state
farms  and increasing the value of the work point on collective  farms.  In
1966 Brezhnev directed collective farms  to abandon the work point system
and begin paying workers according to  the wage scale of state farms
(Johnson and Brooks,  1983;  Wadekin, 1989).  With this  the  entire
agricultural work force became hired laborers on straight wage contracts
with a high degree of job  security.
The wage contracts and soft budget constraints at the  farm level
contributed to escalating costs of production during the  1970s,  growing
farm debt, and an increasing burden of direct subsidy  to the  sector.
Workers and farm managers rejected the collective contract by adopting  it
fully and transforming its  substance to  the old-straight wage contract
with higher wage  levels.  Lease contracting may suffer  the same fate
unless financial discipline is  imposed and wages  are  limited to what the
farms can afford to pay under a rational pricing system.  The new debt
write-off program  says remarkably little about financial discipline.
23Changes  in marketing, credit,  input supply, and access of rural people to
consumer goods  are needed before opportunities to work more efficiently
and independently will appeal  to many workers.
The  likelihood that this kind of sweeping change can be designed and
implemented from the center now appears  low.  The current emphasis on
regional autonomy suggests  that republics will be encouraged to draft
their own agricultural policies.  This presents an unprecedented
opportunity for republics such as  the Baltics  to  try their own
agricultural reforms.  It also presents the  danger that each region will
strive for regional self-sufficiency with resulting reduction of
comparative advantage and gains from interregional domestic trade.
24ENDNOTES
1.  Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural  and  Applied
Economics,  University of  Minnesota,  St.  Paul,  55108
2.  Workers  on genuine  lease  contracts would not  receive
guaranteed wages,  but many targeted  lease  contracts may be
written with implicit  guaranteed wages.  Targeted  leases appear
to  be  rather  easily subverted into  straight wage  contracts,  and
heavy reliance  on targeted  leasing may replicate  the  fiasco with
the  collective  contract.  Furthermore, both  targeted  and  free
leases usually contain clauses  releasing the  lessee  from
contractual  obligations  if  events  "outside  his  control"  reduce
yields.  These  clauses  could easily be  interpreted to  support
guaranteed wages  as  minimal remuneration for workers.
3.  This  could be  an  invitation  for widespread  adoption of
fictitious  leases.  Unless  the  debt  write-off  is  coupled with
financial  discipline  it  will  lead  to  another build-up  of  debt  to
cover  current expenses.
4.  If  it  is  feared  that  leaseholders will mine  the  fertility of
the  soil,  then short  term  lessees  should pay more  than long  term
leaseholders,  if  the  long  term  leases  are  binding on both
parties.  This  line of  reasoning, however, .is not behind the
recommended rates.  Furthermore,  if  deterioration  in  soil  quality
is  feared,  it  should be  addressed by  policy instruments  other
than differentiated rental  rates.
5.  Analysis  of  the  collective  contract  in agriculture  and  the
optimistic  assessment  in  1987  of  its  potential by  Soviet
commentators  and some  foreign observers  or  can be  seen  in V.P.
Gagnon, Jr.,  "Gorbachev and  the  Collective  Contract Brigade,"
Soviet  Studies,  Vol.  XXXIX,  January,  1987,  pp.  1-23.References
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